Modern commercial aircraft have extensive automation which helps the pilot by performing computations, obtaining data, and completing procedural tasks. The pilot display must contain enough information so that the pilot can correctly predict the aircraft's behavior, while not overloading the pilot with unnecessary information. Human-automation interaction is currently evaluated through extensive simulation. In this paper, using both hybrid and discreteevent system techniques, we show how one could mathematically verify that an interface contains enough information for the pilot to safely and unambiguously complete a desired maneuver. We first develop a nonlinear, hybrid model for the longitudinal dynamics of a large civil jet aircraft in an autoland/go-around maneuver. We find the largest controlled subset of the aircraft's flight envelope for which we can guarantee both safe landing and safe go-around. We abstract a discrete procedural model using this result, and verify a discrete formulation of the pilot display against it. An interface which fails this verification could result in nondeterministic or unpredictable behavior from the pilot's point of view.
Introduction
One of the key enabling technologies for increased automation in human-machine systems is verification, which allows for heightened confidence that the s y 5 tem will perform as desired. To verify system safety, the safety specification is first represented as a desired subset of the state space in which the system should remain. The process of verifying safety then involves computing the subset of the state space which is backwards reachable from this "safe set" of states; if this backwards reachable set intersects any states outside the desired region, then the system is deemed unsafe. We can restrict system behavior by pruning away system trajectories which lead to unsafe states, to synthe size a controller which, if enforced, guarantees safety.
In the past several years, a method 1 1 1 and a numerical tool 12, 31 have been developed for verifying the safety of hybrid systems. Previous work, for example 141, has focused on applications of hybrid system theory to fully automated systems, assuming that the controller itself is an automaton. Here we consider the problem of controlling semi-automated systems, in which the automaton and a human controller share authority over the control of the system 151. In particular, we consider the problem of verification of an interface between a semi-automated hybrid system and a human controller, and we pose the question: Is the information displayed to the human controller about the hybrid system euolution suficient for the human controller to act in such a way that the system =mains safe? We consider this problem within the framework of an example: the automatic landing system (autoland) of a large civil jet airliner.
The antoland system of modern aircraft is one of the most safety-critical components, and is subject to stringent certification criteria [61. Modeling the aircraft's behavior, which incorporates logic from the autopilot as well as inherently complicated aircraft dynamics, results in a high-dimensional hybrid system with many continuous and discrete states. Most of the information is abstracted away, so that only a subset of this information is displayed to the pilot. Here, we are interested in verifying that the cockpit interface provides the pilot with enough information so that the pilot can safely land or safely go-around.
In a typical autoland maneuver (Figure l) , the aircraft descends towards the glideslope, an inertial beam which the aircraft can track. With the landing gear down, the pilot sets the flaps at FlapsZO, the first high-lift configuration in the landing sequence. After capturing the glideslope signal, the pilot increases flap deflection, stepping through both Flaps-25 and Flaps-30 by the time the aircraft reaches 1000' altitude. Near 50', the aircraft leaves the glideslope and begins a flare maneuver, which allows the aircraft t o touchdown smoothly on the runway with an appropriate descent rate.
If for any reason the pilot or air traffic controller deems the landing unacceptable (debris on the runway, a pctential conflict with another aircraft, or severe wind gusts, for example), the pilot must initiate a gc-around maneuver. A guaround can be initiated anytime after the glideslope has been captured and before the aircraft touches down. Pushing the gc-around button engages a sequence of events designed to make the aircraft climb as quickly as possible to a dialed-in missed-approach altitude which the pilot usually sets to 2500'.
Aerodynamic Characteristics
The phases of landing and gc-around correspond to fundamentally different operating conditions of the aircraft. We model the nonlinear longitudinal dynamics (Table 1) . CL,, = 5.105 in all modes.
Procedural A u t o m a t o n
The discrete modes of our hybrid system result from the combination of aircraft dynamics and autopilot modes. We formulate a hybrid procedural model based on landing/gc-around procedures a pilot is trained to follow. We focus on a small part of the autoland p r o cedure, beginning with the flare maneuver. The pilot's "user model" of the autoland system, based on the pilot's display, manuals, training, and personal experience, is necessarily different from the complete aircraft "truth model" [7] . Discrepancies between these models can result in mode confusion, a potentially unsafe situation in which the system does not behave as the pilot anticipates [5, 8, 91 . Although the human factors community has historically dominated research on human-automation interaction [9, 10, 11, 121, there have recently been efforts by the formal methods community [7, 13, 14, 15 , 161 as well as system and control communities [I71 to address these safety-critical problem. We build our methodology based on [7] , in which user-interfaces are verified for a given task. In [7] the hybrid plant model is represented as an abstracted discrete system in which the system dynamics are model& as plant-triggered (dynamic) transitions. It is not shown there how the discrete representation with its dynamic transitions are derived. In the present work, we represent the plant model as an explicit hybrid system and show how, with the aid of a control component, the detailed transformation into the equivalent discrete representation is performed.
In this paper, we first develop a model of longitudinal aircraft dynamics in high-lift configurations used during a landing/guaround procedure. Using a computational tool for hybrid systems, we find the largest controllable set for which we can guarantee the aircraft can both safely land and safely gearound. We a p ply the control law synthesized from this computation, and formulate a new, safe hybrid automaton. Room this automaton, we abstract a discrete event system which represents operation in the regions which result in safe landing or gc-around maneuvers. We formulate the interface as a discrete event system, as well. Using the verification techniques described in [7] , we verify the interface against the abstracted procedural model. Lastly, we discuss implications of our results and directions for future work. Although go-arounds are unpredictable and may be required at any time during the autoland prior to touchdown, CTTOGA is a controlled transition because the pilot must initiate the go-around for it to occur. Certain events occur simultaneously: changing the flaps t o Flaps-30 and event UTOGA: raising the landing gear and h 2 0: and lowering the landing gear and h 2 halt.
State and Input Bounds
Each mode in the procedural automaton is subject to state and input bounds, due to constraints arising from aircraft aerodynamics and desired aircraft behavior. These bounds, shown in mined by the desired maneuver 1231. Additionally, at touchdown, 0 E [On, 12.9"] t o prevent a tail strike, and h 2 -1.829 m/s to prevent damage to the landing gear.
Safety Analysis
The state bounds just described define flight envelopes for each of the discrete modes. These envelopes are not necessarily controlled invariant. Thus, we need to determine what subsets of these envelopes are actually controllable given the input authority available to the autopilot. Because the nonlinear dynamics of our model (1) make analytic determination of the controllable subsets impossible, we employ a previously developed computational algorithm for finding controlled invariant sets for this problem 131.
Computing Reachable Sets
For each discrete mode of the autoland system, we define the target set as the region outside the flight envelope WO, denoted (WO)" for the complement of WO.
Given some dynamically evolving system and wme target set, we define the backward reachable set W'(t) as the set of all system states which reach the target set in time t. The autopilot inputs a and T try to drive the state away from the target set, to keep the aircraft within WO.
Computing the reachable set in a discrete system with a finite number of states-and hence a finite number of possible transitions-is a straightforward but possibly time consuming t,ask of enumerating all t.he states which have a path bo the target set. Computing reachable sets for a continuous system is a much more difficult undertaking; for example, how should the uncountably many states in any nontrivial target set be represented?
An algorithm has been developed for computing the reachable sets of cont,inuous nonlinear systems, based on a time dependent Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) part,ial dif- (2) where H(x!p) = maxUEupTf(x:u), for the function J : X x (-co, 01 4 1w: we obtain an implicit representation of the reachable set W"(t) = {z E XIJ(z,-t) 5 0).
The statedependent control synthesized from this calculation is U' (.) = argmax,,upTf(z,U).
Analytically solving (2) for a general Jo(z) and f(x.u) is likely to be impossible. Computational algorithms are complicated by the fact that for even smooth Jo(x) and f(z, U), the solution J ( z , t ) can develop discontinnit.ies in its derivatives after finite time, and hence cease to solve (2) in a classical sense. The appropriate weak solution is the viscosity solution 1241, and level set algorithms [Z5] are numerical techniques developed to compute such solutions. A set of high resolution schemes [26] have been designed and implemented [3] to compute J ( x , t ) , and hence the boundary of the reachable set W c ( t ) , very accurately.
Computing Controllable Flight Envelopes
In any given mode of Hprocedurer the aircraft should remain within its flight envelope WO. To determine the maximal controllable subset W of WO, we run a reachable set computation. The reachable set typically converges to a fixed point: W c ( t ) -W" as t -fco.
We call W the safe flight envelope. Yet the full autopilot system contains transitions bet,ween modes, and so we cannot examine any mode in isolation.
W e separate the hybrid procedural model across the user-controlled switch UTOGA into two hybrid subsystems, HF and HT, shown in Figure 2 . Computationally, automatic transitions are smoothly accomplished by concatenating modes across the switch, so that the change in dynamics across the switching surface is modeled as another nonlinearity in the dyna.mics. Additionally, we assume in HT that if the aircraft leaves the top of the computational domain ( h = 20 m) without exceeding its flight envelope, it is capable of reaching Altitude mode, which we consider to be completely safe.
The initial flight envelopes ( W F )~ and (WT)
O are determined by state bounds on each mode given in Table 2 .
.We perform the reachability computation on HF and HT to obtain the safe flight envelopes WF and WT. Figure 3 shows W F , and Figure 4 shows WT in Toga-Up and Toga-Max modes. (Note that the boundary of WF along y = 0 corresponds with the transitjon boundary of WT between Toga-Up and Toga-Max, h = 0.) Figure 5 shows the continuous region WF n WT from which we can guarantee both a safe landing and a safe gc-around. Notice that this set is smaller than W F , the region from which a safe landing is possible: the pilot is further restricted in executing a go-around. There are states from which a safe landing is possible, hut a safe gearound is not. 4 Interface Verification A general verification technique for analyzing interfaces has been sought for many years. The need was motivated by serious incidents and accidents, involving human interaction with complex automated systems (e.g., cockpit automation). Recently, a theory, methodology, and a detailed verification procedure was developed by researchers at NASA 17, 161. The methodology considers four elements: the machine model, user model, interface model, and the task specification (e.g., safe/unsafe, multiple modes). In this section we use the methodology of [7] in the context of this hybrid system example.
In most commercial aircraft, the low-level control is performed by the autopilot, and the pilot anticipates system behavior by understanding the behavior of each autopilot mode. We assume an automated controller enforces U = U*(.) within each hybrid subsystem. By doing so, we mimic the supervisory role pilots have in highly aut.omated aircraft, including the option not to enforce a recommended switch.
The pilot activates various knobs, buttons, and toggles t o change the system's mode. Interaction between the pilot's actions and the system's modes are encapsulated by a finitestate machine representation of the interQinterrace are determined by the indications on the display; events Cjnterfxe are determined by internal transitions in the system, or by the pilot's actions. The transition function is hintedace. The interface for an autoland/gwaround is shown in Figure 6 .
To compare the interface against the procedural model, we implement the controller for safety U * ( . ) in Hprocedure and create a discrete abstraction G;lrocedure based on the resultant closed-loop hybrid system. \Ve partition the state-space in each mode into the interior, boundary, and complement of the safe Right envelope in that particular mode. Across the user-controlled switch Figure 7 .
Implications and Conclusion
There is an ongoing debate in aviation, space, and other safety-critical industries about the role of the operator and the extent t o which automation can and should be used. This debate has been fueled by incidents and accidents in which pilots were surprised about the hehavior of the automation. While the debate will continue, it is clear that some of the problems in humanautomation interaction stem from design problems. Interface verification methods are critical for identifying design problems early on in the design phase. Current efforts at NASA are aimed at developing methods for extracting the machine, interface, and user-models from Java code and then applying the interface verification method of 171 to identify error states.
Verification within a hybrid framework allows us to account for the inherently complicated dynamics underlying the simple, discrete representations displayed to the pilot. In this example, in order t o safely supervise the system, the pilot must have enough information to know before entering'a gc-around maneuver whether or not the aircraft will remain safe.
The interface verification methodology begins with a procedural model, a hybrid system which incorporates discrehe mode logic & well as nonlinear continuous dynamics. The hybrid safety computation provides us with continuous control restrictions, which, if enforced, guarantee that the system will always remain safe. This guarantee holds to within the accuracy of our model. We ahstract a discrete event system from this hybrid system with safety restrictions. To do so, we partition the continuous states of the hybrid system with safety restrictions according t o their location in safe or unsafe regions in each mode. This abstraction, along with the formulation of the interface model as a discrete event system, allows us t o use existing interface verification techniques [7] . We compare the discrete interface and procedural models by analyzing their composition for error, blocking, and augmented states, which result in confusing and unpredictable behavior from the pilot's point of view.
The methodology presented here also extends to systems with disturbances, such as wind or an engine failure. \i'hile verification tools can aid design, we also hope to contribute directly to the design problem (as in [27]), within a hybrid framework.
